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STATE OF WASHINGTON  
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BY SARAH R. PENDLETON  
CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 1040270

(Court of Appeals, Division I, No. 857240)

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The Villa Marina Association of Apartment Owners,

Respondent – Plaintiff

v.

John E. Collins, Jr., a/k/a Jake Collins, Jr.,

Appellant - Defendant

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ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This case is not exceptional, either factually or legally. In fact, Appellant's ("Collins") Petition for Review ("Pet.") states untruths and makes critical omissions that are easily disproven or corrected by a cursory review of the record. Primarily, Collins argues that Respondent ("the Association") should have discontinued the litigation after he sold his condominium. *Pet. p. 2*. Collins curiously neglects to mention that he was the one who kept the litigation going by insisting that "he never owed the Association anything and was entitled to a refund of what he had paid once this court vacated the earlier summary judgment order." *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 33 Wn. App. 2d 1057 (2025). He even continued to assert in his Opening Brief that a trial was necessary. *Id.* Curiously, his Petition for Review again seeks remand of the case to "proceed to trial" *Pet. p. 8*.

The resolution of the case required the Court of Appeals to resolve three issues:

1. Whether the trial court properly denied continuance of Collins's Motion to Continue the Summary Judgment Hearing;
2. Whether the trial court properly granted the Association's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment; and
3. Whether the trial court properly awarded the Association its attorney fees and costs.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court (1) had not abused its discretion in denying Collins's request to continue; (2) properly granted the Association's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment when it presented adequate affidavits, including an undisputed declaration from a CPA, Paul Heneghan, in determining Collins's outstanding balance due; and (3) properly awarded the Association its attorney fees and costs as the substantially prevailing party and its entitlement to attorney fees under RCW 64.34.364(14) and its governing documents. *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 33 Wn. App. 2d 1057 (2025).

Disagreeing with the Court of Appeals, Collins petitions for discretionary review, ostensibly under RAP 13.4(b), arguing that “the decision conflicts with the Court of Appeals’ previous (unpublished) decision; ...raises significant question of law under both the U.S. and Washington constitutions; [and] ...involves significant issues of public interest....” *Pet. p. 6*. However, Collins’s Petition does not qualify for review under RAP 13.4 (b)(1)(2)(3) or (4) because it fails to establish: (i) a conflict between the Court of Appeals’ decision and a Supreme Court decision (RAP 13.4(b)(1)); (ii) a conflict between the Court of Appeals’ decision and a published Court of Appeals decision (RAP 13.4(b)(2)); (iii) a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States (RAP 13.4(b)(3)); or (iv) an issue of substantial public interest warranting Supreme Court review (RAP 13.4(b)(4)). Therefore, this Court should deny the Petition.

## II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Does the Petition for Review fail to qualify for discretionary review under RAP 13.4(b)(1) because there is no conflict between the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision and any Supreme Court decision? **Answer: Yes - deny review.**
2. Does the Petition for Review fail to qualify for discretionary review under RAP 13.4(b)(2) because there is no conflict between the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision and any published Court of Appeals decision? **Answer: Yes - deny review.**
3. Does the Petition for Review fail to qualify for discretionary review under RAP 13.4(b)(3) because there is no significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States? **Answer: Yes - deny review.**
4. Does Petition for Review fail to qualify for discretionary review under RAP 13.4(b)(4) because it does not involve

an issue of substantial public interest that requires Supreme Court intervention? **Answer: Yes - deny review.**

### **III. COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

In December 2016, the Association filed its first lawsuit against Collins, King County Cause #16-2-31059-1 SEA, (“the 2016 Lawsuit”). CP 409. That matter concerned past due assessments, special assessments, late fees, interest, and attorney fees and costs on Collins’s “Assessment Ledger” from approximately November 2014 through February 2017. CP 583 – 586. The parties settled the matter, the case was dismissed with prejudice, and Collins paid the judgment entered in the amount of \$12,006.86 in February 2017. CP 410.

Shortly thereafter, Collins again became delinquent in payment of assessments, special assessments, late fees incurred, interest charges, and related attorney fees. *Id.* The Association filed suit against Collins in December 2019, King County Cause #19-2-32346-9 SEA, (“the 2019 Lawsuit”). *Id.*

During these proceedings Collins alleged the Association made multiple errors on the Assessment Ledger such as failing to timely record payments and then misapplying late fees and interest, charging a late fee for missed monthly special assessment payments when he elected to pay the special assessment in a lump sum, and completely failing to record other payments, which generated additional fees and costs. CP 595-6. These errors, Collins alleged, began in November 2014, the accounting period covered by the prior lawsuit. *Id.* Collins testified that he made a “business decision” to settle the prior lawsuit; however, he continued to insist the Association’s Assessment Ledger from that period was incorrect. *Id.* To demonstrate this, he prepared his own ledger purporting to show that by the time the Association applied the settlement payment of \$12,006.86, that he actually had a credit balance of over \$11,000.00. CP 596, CP 644-5.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the Association and entered judgments in the amount of \$44,092.27

in past due assessments, special assessments, late fees, interest, and attorney fees. CP 599. The attorney fees comprised \$24,922.13 of the total judgment. *Id.* The trial court later awarded a supplemental judgment of \$11,415.35 in additional attorney fees and costs. CP *Id.* Collins initiated the first appeal related to this dispute.

The Court of Appeals, in No. 81865-1-1, found that there was still a genuine issue of material fact related to the “starting point” of the amounts owed related to the assessment ledger in the 2019 Lawsuit, and it reversed the summary judgment award, vacated the prior judgments, and remanded for further proceedings. CP 607. While it is correct that Collins sold his condo during the pendency of the appeal, the Association still had the burden to prove the righteousness of the judgments previously entered, but more importantly, Collins continued to assert that the Association’s ledger was incorrect, beginning with that first late fee on “day one” in November 2014. RP 59, 67. Collins alleged that he did not owe the Association

anything, including the past due assessments and special assessments recovered in the prior settlement payment of \$12,006.86 or the judgment for past due assessments, and related late fees, interest, and attorney fees incurred. RP 58. Thus, the litigation continued.

Collins engaged new counsel, his fifth attorney by that point, in the 2019 Lawsuit. CP 311. Collins propounded additional discovery to the Association, CP 807, despite having previously received over 10,000 documents; however, he refused to respond to the Association's discovery. The trial court granted the Association's motion to compel, motion to enforce, and related fee awards for each. CP 120, 282, 150, 405. Collins also refused to respond to the Association's attempts to schedule mediation, and the trial court waived ADR. CP 785. Collins later complained that the Association would not simply sit down and talk to him. RP 89.

Meanwhile, the Association engaged a Certified Public Accountant to review the Association's ledgers, compiled by

multiple management companies over the years. CP 727. The CPA, Paul Heneghan, carefully reviewed each transaction, beginning in November 2014, even though issues related to that time had been settled and dismissed with prejudice in the 2016 Lawsuit. *Id.* Because the ledger was essentially the same ledger even though the period under review had changed, earlier errors could potentially affect the later ledger covered in the 2019 Lawsuit. CP 727-729. Because the court on summary judgment is required to view facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Mr. Heneghan credited payments disputed as to date received on the date most favorable to Collins, and credited any late fees or interest that would have been affected by receipt of the payment on the earlier date. *Id.*

Mr. Heneghan also reviewed Collins's spreadsheet, previously submitted to defeat summary judgment on appeal, and noticed glaring errors. CP 728. Although Collins had credited his payments for the first special assessment period, he failed to charge the first special assessment against the ledger,

thereby creating a false credit balance. *Id.* In addition, Mr. Heneghan found that Collins confused periods in which he elected to pay special assessments either monthly or in lump sum. *Id.* Although the Association had properly applied the lump sum, Collins was otherwise delinquent each month, and the related late fees were appropriately assessed pursuant to the Association's policies and procedures. *Id.* Mr. Heneghan also confirmed that payments Collins alleged to be missing had been properly received and credited on the ledger. CP 729.

Collins' fifth attorney withdrew from the case as the Association was awarded attorney fees for its motion to enforce the order compelling responses to discovery. CP 245.

Thereafter, Collins filed multiple motions to extend the case schedule and trial date. CP 284 – 286, CP 779 – 784, CP 787 – 789. The Association opposed the motions because the 2019 Lawsuit was approximately 3.5 years old by that time, and the trial court agreed, denying the motions. CP 15, 64.

The Association renewed its motion for summary judgment, which Collins did not oppose by filing a timely, responsive pleading. RP 67. He filed his response approximately one day before the hearing and the trial court granted the Association's motion to strike. RP 71. Collins did not file a motion to request a continuance of the summary judgment hearing pursuant to CR 56(f). *Record, generally.*

At the summary judgment hearing, Collins references a "calendar proposal for this hearing – next week, October 4<sup>th</sup>, give everybody a chance or whatever it's Ms. Saphronia would like to do it, or you the court. That's – I realize this is late, and that's why I put in a calendar date for this." RP 70. The record contains no formal requests by Collins to continue the hearing on summary judgment to that date or any other. *Record, generally.* The court replied, "[a]ll right. And the court rejected your requests..." referring to Collins' multiple motions to continue the trial date and the associated case schedule, *in general.* RP 4 – 15, RP 28 – 31, RP 40 – 42, CP 284 – 286, CP

779 – 784, CP 787 – 789. The court previously and properly denied each of Collins’s motions to continue the trial and case schedule.

During oral argument, the trial court offered Collins *many opportunities* to say, “Yes, this matter should be dismissed because I sold my condominium and no longer owe any past due assessments.”. RP 58, 60, 64, 65. After Collins seemed to not comprehend what was being said, the trial court outright explained the offer it was making to Collins as follows:

“THE COURT: Well, so, Mr. Collins, I'll show my cards here a little bit. I thought you might -- I thought you might come to court today and try to argue that you paid -- you already paid for all the assessment liens and all of the attorney's fees, and all the association is doing now is trying to wrap the bill and attorney's fees and make you pay the extra \$25,000 that has nothing to do with this collections dispute. Because you've already paid, and you are not seeking repayment. I thought that might be your argument. In which case the court -- in which case the court might -- might conceivably dismiss the association's lawsuit because one could argue that the attorney's fees incurred since May of 2022 have not been incurred in connection with collection of delinquent assessments, because there's no longer any delinquency. You already paid those amounts. But what I'm hearing

today is those amounts -- you still dispute your payment of those amounts. And you think that you're entitled to get money back, and you want the court to order the association to pay some of those funds back. And so that, to me, if that is your position, means that I am not going to dismiss the association's lawsuit, because they are incurring attorney's fees in connection with a collection dispute for -- over delinquent assessments, because you contend that they need to pay you that money back. So do you have any response on that issue?...

...MR. COLLINS: I'm asking -- yeah, my goal is to get the lawsuit dismissed with prejudice and show that the money was never owed. I've been consistent on that from day one, nine years.

THE COURT: Okay. Understood. So that, in my mind puts to rest that question.”.

RAP 65-67.

Despite the trial court all but ushering Collins towards the end of this lawsuit if he would just give up his untenable position, Collins insisted that the case move forward. RP 58, 59, 60, 64, 67. He needed to file more motions, or have more time, or go to trial, or take whatever additional steps were needed to return to that first late fee assessed back in November 2014, to prove that he never owed the Association anything, and that all payments he made previously – the settlement

payment, the judgment payoffs – should be returned to him. RP 59, 60, 64, 67.

The Association argued that it was still in the position of defending its ledger and the righteousness of the delinquent assessments, and related fees, costs, and interest, previously collected, and there was no basis for the prior payments to be returned. RP 60-1. Thus, the trial court was satisfied that proceedings needed to move forward and heard oral argument on the Association’s renewed motion for summary judgment. RP 67.

Collins’ oral argument, based largely on inadmissible evidence, speculation, and a new theory of a fee pyramid scheme by the Association, did not persuade the trial court that he had raised a genuine issue of material fact. RP 105. The trial court granted the Association’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and awarded attorney fees and costs, the reasonableness of which were reserved for a later determination. RP 106. Collins appealed.

The Association filed its motion to approve attorney fees and costs, CP 853, and Collins did not file an opposition or object in any way to the reasonableness of fees. *Record, generally*. The trial court granted the Association's attorney fees and costs as requested. CP 1145. Collins appealed that order as well, which the Court of Appeals consolidated with the appeal of the Order Granting Summary Judgment; however, he supplied no briefing nor did he provide any argument against the attorney fees and costs awarded.

Both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals concluded: it was appropriate to deny Collins's request for a continuance of the hearing on summary judgment. Collins had failed to file a motion for a continuance and then failed to argue how the trial court's denial of his request was thereafter untenable to meet the abuse of discretion standard. *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 33 Wn. App. 2d 1057 (2025).

The Court of Appeals also determined that the trial court properly granted summary judgment because Collins did not

produce “any competent evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact....” *Id.*

In addition, the Court of Appeals did not agree with Collins’ position that it was improper for the Association to continue litigating and incurring attorney fees, when it was Collins who insisted that he never owed the Association anything and even in his Opening Brief for the second appeal asserted the case needed to go to trial. *Id.* Thus, the Court of Appeals found no basis by which the grant of summary judgment was improper.

Finally, the Court of Appeals properly determined that the Association should be awarded its attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party on appeal and pursuant to RCW 64.34.364(14) and the Association’s governing documents. Collins failed to make any argument to the contrary in either his opening brief or his reply.

Collins’s Petition for Review followed, untimely, as has become a hallmark of the instant litigation.

#### **IV. COUNTER-ARGUMENT**

##### **a. Collins' Petition Fails to Meet RAP 13.4**

###### **Standards.**

Collins petitions for Supreme Court review pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), (3) and (4). However, his Petition fails to assign error to any portion of the Court of Appeals' decision, nor does he identify grounds for review under RAP 13.4(b). *See Pet. pg. 6-8.* Supreme Court review cannot be had absent a qualifying basis under RAP 13.4(b). Furthermore, RAP 13.4(c)(7) requires a "direct and concise statement of the reason why review should be accepted under one or more of the tests established in section (b), with argument", which Collins failed to provide. Also, Collins' petition does not qualify for review under RAP 13.4 or its sub-parts—he does not identify any conflict between the Court of Appeals' decision and a decision of the Washington Supreme Court (RAP 13.4(b)(1)), any conflict between the Court of Appeals' decision and a published Court of Appeals decision (RAP 13.4(b)(2)), any

significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States (RAP 13.4(b)(3)), or any issue of substantial public interest (RAP 13.4(b)(4)). These failures disqualify Collins’s petition from review under RAP 13.4.

**b. The Petition Fails to Satisfy RAP 13.4(b)(1)**

**Because There is No Conflict with a Supreme Court Decision.**

Collins ostensibly petitions for Supreme Court review under RAP 13.4(b)(1), which requires a conflict between the Court of Appeals’ decision and a decision of the Washington Supreme Court. However, Collins fails to identify such a conflict. He cites two Supreme Court cases:

- *Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.* 179 Wn. 123, 127, 35 P.2d

1090 (1934) for the general proposition that the Court of Appeals does not have unlimited discretion to “set aside, modify, and/or amend its prior decisions [or those] of the lower courts.” *Pet. at 7*. However, *Baxter* is inapplicable to the instant

case because it concerned a matter that had previously been to the Supreme Court, was reversed and remanded for trial, then ultimately returned to the Supreme Court. *Id.* The issue considered was whether the parties and trial court were bound by decisions of law in the first appeal.

However, in the first related appeal, the Court of Appeals did not decide any issues of law. Rather, it determined that the standard for summary judgment had not been met at that time, vacated the awards of attorney fees, and remanded for further proceedings. *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 19 Wn. App. 2d 1025 (2021); CP 9-11. Collins appears to argue that the Association was not allowed to produce any additional “facts” upon remand; however, the law of the case doctrine does not prevent supplementation with additional facts.

The law of the case doctrine most commonly “stands for the proposition that once there is an appellate holding enunciating a principle of law, that holding will be followed in subsequent stages of the same litigation.” *State v. Johnson*, 188 Wn.2d 742,

755, 399 P.3d 507 (2017)(quoting *Roberson v. Perez*, 156 Wn.2d 33, 41, 123 P.3d 844 (2005)). The doctrine does not apply to factual findings. *Karanjah v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 199 Wn. App. 903, 916, 401 P.3d 381 (2017). In addition, “[Q]uestions determined on appeal, or which might have been determined had they been presented, will not again be considered on a subsequent appeal **if there is no substantial change in the evidence at a second determination of the cause.**” *Folsom v. Cnty. of Spokane*, 111 Wn.2d 256, 263, 759 P.2d 1196, 1200 (1988)(**emphasis added**)(citation omitted).

“A moving party may renew a motion for summary judgment notwithstanding denial of an earlier motion by showing a different set of facts or some other reason justifying renewal of the motion.” *William W. Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial* ¶ 14:367 (1995). The earlier denial is not *res judicata* or “law of the case”. *Id.* (citing *Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America*, 591 F.2d 74, 79

(9th Cir.1979); *Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco*, 18 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1994)).

The Court of Appeals found Collins’s argument concerning law of the case doctrine unpersuasive because despite finding that summary judgment was improper based on the evidence presented at the time of the first appeal, there was nothing in that opinion that “precluded the Association from renewing its motion with additional evidence” following remand. *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 33 Wn. App. 2d 1057 (2025).

• *Buob v. Feenaughty Machinery Co.*, 4 Wn. 2d 276, 103 P. 2d 325 (1940) is also cited in support of the law of the case doctrine. However, the law of the case doctrine does not preclude the presentation of new facts in a subsequent appeal; it requires only that the court adhere to the principles of law laid out in its prior opinion, to the extent that those principles are still applicable to the record currently under review. *In re Sixth Ave. Improvement in City of Seattle*, 155 Wash. 459, 466, 284

P. 738, 741 (1930). There were no principles of law in the Court of Appeals' Opinion in No. 81865-1-1, thus, Collins's arguments concerning the law of the case doctrine are unavailing.

**c. The Petition Fails to Satisfy RAP 13.4(b)(3)**

**Because There is No Significant Question of Law  
under the Constitution of the State of Washington  
or of the United States**

Although Collins refers to both the "U.S. and Washington constitutions", he does not refer to RAP 13.4(b)(3) or its standards. By failing to clearly raise the issue in a concise statement of issues presented for review, the Supreme Court will strike the issue from the brief. *See State v. Korum* 157 Wn.2d 614, 141 P.3d 13, (2006) appeal after new sentencing hearing, 141 Wn.App. 1005, review denied 169 Wn.2d 1002, 236 P.3d 205. Here, Collins merely alludes that there are significant issues concerning the Washington State and United States Constitution but altogether fails to brief what those issues

might be or why the Supreme Court must grant review to address any constitutional issues that may exist. Accordingly, the Supreme Court will not consider arguments that a party fails to brief, *Sprague v. Spokane Valley Fire Dep't*, 189 Wn. 2d 858, 409 P.3d 160 (2018).

**d. The Petition Fails to Satisfy Either RAP 13.4(b)(2) or (4) Because There is No Conflict with a Published Court of Appeals Decision, Nor Does This Case Involve an Issue of Substantial Public Interest.**

Although he does not actually refer to either RAP 13.4(b)(2) or to RAP 13.4(b)(4), - or their standards-, Collins appears to invoke those provisions as a basis for granting discretionary review. However, he fails to satisfy the requirements of either rule. The Court of Appeals' decision in this case does not involve an issue of substantial public interest, nor does it conflict with a published Court of Appeals decision.

**e. The Decision Does Not Present an Issue of  
Substantial Public Interest Under RAP 13.4(b)(4)**

It is unclear how Collins feels the Court of Appeals' ruling raises an issue of substantial public interest because he fails to articulate this in his brief. Even so, RAP 13.4(b)(4) applies only when an issue affects a broad segment of the public beyond the parties to the case.

For example, in *State v. Watson*, 155 Wn.2d 574, 577, 122 P.3d 903 (2005), the Court found substantial public interest where the Court of Appeals' decision affected sentencing policies in all Pierce County criminal cases. No such widespread impact exists here. This case concerns Collins' individual payments towards condominium dues, interest, late fees, and the like. The Court of Appeals' decision is fact-specific and does not announce a new rule of law or alter how Washington courts apply CR 56. The ruling simply finds that

the Association met its burden thereunder and subsequently upheld an award of attorney fees.

**f. The Decision Does Not Conflict with a Published Court of Appeals Decision under RAP 13.4(b)(2).**

Collins argues that the Court of Appeals' decision in this case is "in conflict with its previous decision". *Pet. p. 6*. Presumably Collins is referring to *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 19 Wn. App. 2d 1025 (2021), which is an unpublished decision and does not meet the standard under RAP 13.4(b)(2). More importantly, the 2025 decision is not in conflict with the 2021 decision. The earlier decision merely found that summary judgment was not appropriate and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. There was no conflict with the earlier opinion, as there was no requirement in the prior opinion that the Association not bring a renewed motion for summary judgement, as the Court of Appeals noted in their opinion in this matter. *Opinion, pg. 7-8*. Additional uncontested facts were

presented on a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, which was then upheld. There is still no conflict between the two Court of Appeals' decisions and Collins fails to meet the standard for the Supreme Court to accept review under RAP 13.4(b)(2).

**g. The Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Association.**

During the trial court proceedings, Collins failed to offer any evidence whatsoever that contradicted the expert's analysis as to amounts due and owing to the Association. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment because Collins failed to introduce any genuine issue of material fact.

On appeal, Collins failed to offer any argument as to how the trial court's denial of his request to extend the hearing date for the summary judgment motion was untenable. Thus, the abuse of discretion standard was not met.

In addition, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the grant of summary judgment because Collins failed to set forth any valid argument why it should not. The law of the case doctrine requires that "...[when] an appellate holding [enunciates] a principle of law, that holding will be followed in subsequent stages of the same litigation." *State v. Johnson*, 188 Wn.2d 742, 755, 399 P.3d 507 (2017). Collins' "law of the case doctrine" argument is inapplicable, because the Court of Appeals did not articulate any new points of law or change the way the law is applied in the first appeal. Collins failed to argue against the Association's requested attorney fees and thus, the Court of Appeals properly upheld the attorney fee award to the Association.

**h. The Court Should Award the Association its  
Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs Incurred in  
Defending Against the Petition for Review.**

RAP 14.2, RAP 18.1, and RCW 64.34.364(14) grant the Court discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred on appeal. This Court should award the Association its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in responding to the Petition for Review. First, the Association prevailed both in the trial court and at the Court of Appeals. Second, Collins' Petition for Review lacks merit and fails to even identify any qualifying basis for review under RAP 13.4(b). The Association should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in having to relitigate these issues a third time<sup>1</sup>. The Association respectfully requests that this Court award its attorneys' fees and costs against John "Jake" Collins.

## V. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Association prays this Court will **DENY** the Petition for Review.

SIGNED AND DATED this 9<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2025 at Des Moines, Washington.

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<sup>1</sup> Not including litigation occurring prior to the remand following the Court of Appeals decision in *Villa Marina Ass'n of Apartment Owners v. Collins*, 19 Wn. App. 2d 1025 (2021).

Presented by:

**DES MOINES ELDER LAW**

“I certify that this pleading contains a word count of 4,606 words, excluding those portions exempt from the word count by RAP 18.17(c).”

By: /s/ Holly A. Surface

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, that on the date and place below, I caused a true and correct copy of the document to which this certificate is attached to be served upon all parties and/or their counsel of record in the manner indicated below:

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**SIGNED AND DATED** this 9<sup>th</sup> day of June 2025, at Des Moines, Washington.

/s/ Holly A. Surface  
BY: Holly A. Surface

# DES MOINES ELDER LAW

June 09, 2025 - 3:33 PM

## Transmittal Information

**Filed with Court:** Supreme Court  
**Appellate Court Case Number:** 104,027-0  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** Villa Marina Assoc. of Apt. Owners v. John E. Collins Jr.

### The following documents have been uploaded:

- 1040270\_Answer\_Reply\_20250609153138SC768232\_3267.pdf  
This File Contains:  
Answer/Reply - Answer to Petition for Review  
*The Original File Name was 250609 Answer and Objection to Petition for Review.pdf*

### A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

- Ciana.christian@rm-law.com
- jake@jecollins.net
- rachel@soundlegalpartners.com
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### Comments:

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